We are concerned with formal models of reasoning under uncertainty. Many approaches to this problem are known in the literature e.g. Dempster-Shafer theory, bayesian-based reasoning, belief networks, fuzzy logics etc. We propose rough mereology as a foundation for approximate reasoning about complex objects. Our notion of a complex object includes approximate proofs understood as schemes constructed to support our assertions about the world on the basis of our incomplete or uncertain knowledge.
Introduction
We present a formal model of approximate reasoning about processes of synthesis of complex systems. 31] . Our research has been stimulated by the demand for solutions of the following groups of problems, estimated in 1] to be crucial for the progress in the area of automated design and manufacturing. These groups of problems are concerned with the treatment of: Group 1. Poorly de ned, poorly understood or incomplete design speci cations.
Group 2. Negotiations among interacting goals and constraints.
Preprint submitted to Elsevier ScienceGroup 3. Decomposition of problems into subproblems (including the problem of formation of a hierarchical scheme for solving the problem).
Group 4. Adaptation problems (including redesign and reuse problems). Group 5. Problems of knowledge representation and reasoning about knowledge (including mapping of functions to structures and evaluating partial solutions at di erent levels of the synthesis scheme).
Design as well as manufacturing processes involve the space of speci cations and the space of structures. These spaces are present in our approach at each local process site and they meet each other at the inventory level where primitive (indecomposable ) speci cations are converted into primitive (inventory) constructs.
Our analysis can be applied to the following elds concerned with complex systems: [47] [48] . In this eld a complex system of local agents is organized from a set of agents in order to synthesize a solution to a problem.
The accessible knowledge on the basis of which constructs in the synthesis process are selected and classi ed (evaluated) is as a rule incomplete, poorly de ned, or inconsistent. In consequence, we are bound to eveluate the basic ingredients of the synthesis process approximately only, in terms of values of some uncertainty measures which express a degree in which a given construct satis es a given speci cation and in terms of some functors which propagate uncertainty measures along the synthesis scheme.
Many formal models of approximate reasoning are described in the literature e.g. Dempster-Schafer theory of evidence 33 We can extract from these formal models a general scheme for approximate reasoning.
It is not suprising that this scheme encompasses classical models of reasoning adopted in mathematical logic 19] .
The scheme for approximate reasoning can be represented by the following tuple Appr Reas = (Ag; Link; U; St; Dec Sch; O; Inv; Unc mes; Unc prop) where (i) The symbol Ag denotes the set of agents (or agent names).
(ii) The symbol Link denotes a nite set of non-empty strings over the alphabet Ag; for v(ag) = ag 1 ag 2 :::ag k ag 2 Link, we say that v(ag) de nes an elementary synthesis scheme synt(ag 1 ; ag 2 ; ::; ag k ; ag) = synt(v(ag)) with the root ag and the leaf agents ag 1 ; ag 2 ; :::; ag k : The intended meaning of v(ag) is that the agents ag 1 ; ag 2 ; ::; ag k are the children of the agent ag which can send to ag some constructs for assembling a complex artifact. The relation ag ag 0 i ag is a leaf agent in synt(v(ag)) for some v(ag) is usually assumed to be at least an ordering of Ag into a type of acyclic graph; we assume for simplicity that (Ag; ) is a tree with the root root(Ag) and leaf agents in the set Leaf(Ag).
(iii) The symbol U denotes the set fU(ag) : ag 2 Agg of universes of discourse (universes of constructs) of agents.
(iv) The symbol St denotes the set fSt(ag) : ag 2 Agg of standard sets of agents: for ag 2 Ag; the set St(ag) = fst(ag) i g U(ag) is the set od standard constructs (objects ) of the agent ag.
(v) The symbol O denotes the set fO(ag) : ag 2 Agg of operations with O(ag) = fo i (ag)g the set of operations at ag.
(vi) The symbol Dec Sch denotes the set of decomposition schemes, a particular decomposition scheme dec sch j is a tuple (fst(ag) j : ag 2 Agg; (o j (ag) : ag 2 Agg) which satis es the property that if v(ag) = ag 1 ag 2 :::ag k ag then o j (ag)(st(ag 1 ) j ; st(ag 2 ) j ; ::; st(ag k ) j ) = st(ag) j :
The intended meaning of dec sch j is that when any child ag i of ag submits the standard construct st(ag i ) j then the agent ag assembles from st(ag 1 ) j ; st(ag 2 ) j ; ::; st(ag k ) j the standard construct st(ag) j by means of the operation o j (ag). The rule dec sch j establishes therefore a decomposition scheme of any standard construct at the agent root (Ag) into a set of consecutively simpler standards at all other agents. The standard constructs of leaf agents are primitive standards. We can regard the set of decomposition schemes as a skeleton about which the approximate reasoning is organized. Any rule dec sch j conveys a certain knowledge that standard constructs are synthesized from speci ed simpler standard constructs by means of speci ed operations. This ideal knowledge is a reference point for real synthesis processes in which we deal as a rule with constructs which are not standard: in adaptive tasks, for instance, we process new, unseen yet, constructs (objects, signals).
(vii) The symbol Inv denotes the inventory set of primitive constructs.
(viii) The symbol Unc mes denotes the set fUnc mes(ag) : ag 2 Agg of uncertainty measures of agents, where Unc mes(ag) = f j (ag)g and j (ag) U(ag) U(ag) V (ag) is a relation (possibly function) which determines a distance between constructs in U(ag) valued in a set V (ag); usually, V (ag) = 0; 1], the unit interval.
(ix) The symbol Unc prop denotes the set of uncertainty propagation rules fUnc prop(v(ag)) : v(ag) 2 Linkg; for v(ag) = ag 1 ag 2 :::ag k ag 2 Link, we have in Unc prop(v(ag)) the functions f j :V (ag 1 ) V (ag 2 ) ::: V (ag k ) ?! V (ag) such that if j (ag i )(x i ; st(ag i ) j ) = " i for i = 1; 2; ::; k then j (ag)(o j (x 1 ; x 2 ; ::; x k ); st(ag) j ) = " f j (" 1 ; " 2 ; ::; " k ):
The functions f j propagate uncertainty measures from children of ag to ag. The process of synthesis begins at leaf agents which receive primitive constructs and calculate their distances from their respective standards; then the primitive constructs are sent to the parent nodes of leaf agents along with vectors of distance values. The parent nodes synthesize complex constructs from the sent primitives and apply the uncertainty propagating functions in order to calculate from the sent vectors the new vectors of distances from their respective standards. Finally, the root agent root(Ag) receives the constructs from its children from which it assembles the nal construct and calculates the distances of this construct from the root standards. On the basis of the found values, the root agent classi es the nal construct.
The above very general scheme is adapted to the particular cases. We would like to interpret this scheme taking as a particular instance the case of a fuzzy controller 11]. In its version due to Mamdani 18] , in its simplest form, we have two agents: input, output, and standards of agents are expressed in terms of linguistic labels likepositively small, negative, zero etc. Operations of the agent output express the control rules of the controller e.g. the symbol o(positively small; negative) = zero is equivalent to the control rule of the form if st(input) i is positively small and st(input) j is negative then st(output) k is zero. Uncertainty measures of agents are introduced as fuzzy membership functions 11], 46] of the fuzzy sets corresponding to standards i.e. linguistic labels. An input construct (signal) x(input) is fuzzi ed i.e. its distances from input standards are calculated and then the fuzzy logic rules are applied 11]. By means of these rules uncertainty propagating functions are de ned which allow for calculating the distances of the output construct x(output) from the output standards. On the basis of this distances the construct x(output) is evaluated by the defuzzi cation procedure.
Our approach is anchored in rough set theory 20]. This theory assumes that constructs in the universe of discourse are perceived by means of the available information and in consequence these constructs are perceived as collections of constructs which bear the same information about them. The resulting granularity of knowledge is responsible for vagueness of knowledge. We are not able therefore to perceive individual constructs but their collections; we cannot in consequence discuss the membership relation but only containment relation. The counterpart of the notion of a fuzzy membership function would be the notion of a partial containment.
The formal treatment of partial containment is provided by the notion of a rough inclusion 24], 27], 29]. Rough inclusions are construed as most general functional objects conveying the intuitive meaning of the relation of being a part in a degree. In particular, the relation of being a part in the greatest possible degree is the relation of being a (possibly, improper) part in the sense of mereology of Stanislaw Le sniewski 16]. We can regard therefore a rough inclusion as a measure of departing from a decomposition scheme represented by the induced model of mereology of Le sniewski.
In mereology of Le sniewski the notions of a subset and of an element are equivalent and therefore we can interpret rough inclusions as global fuzzy membership functions on the universe of discourse which satisfy certain general requirements responsible for their regular mathematical properties.
We take rough inclusions of agents as measures of uncertainty in their respective universes. We would like to make the following two remarks. Remark 1.1. Any non-leaf agent ag is able to establish a local decomposition scheme of complex constructs in its universe into some simpler parts by means of its rough inclusion (ag) and the relation part (of being a (proper) part) in the induced model of mereology of Le sniewski. Remark 1.2. The mereological relation of being a part is not transitive globally over the whole synthesis scheme as distinct agents use distinct mereological languages.
The process of synthesis of a complex system by a scheme of agents consists in our approach of the two communication stages viz. the top -down communication/negotiation process and the bottom -up communication process. We outline the two stages here.
In the process of top -down communication, a requirement received by the scheme from an external source is decomposed into approximate speci cations of the form ( (ag); "(ag))
for any agent ag of the scheme. The intended meaning of the approximate speci cation ( (ag); "(ag)) is that a construct x 2 U(ag) satis es ( (ag); "(ag))
i there exists a standard st(ag) with the properties that st(ag) satis es the predicate (ag) and (ag)(x; st(ag)) "(ag):
The uncertainty bounds of the form "(ag) are de ned by the agents viz. the root agent root(Ag) chooses "(root(Ag)) and (root(Ag)) as such that according to it any construct x satisfying ( (root(Ag); "(root(Ag)) should satisfy the external requirement in an acceptable degree; the other agents choose their approximate speci cations in negotiations within each elementary scheme synt(v(ag)) for v(ag) 2 Link. The uncertainty bounds "(ag) are evaluated on the basis of uncertainty propagating functions whose approximations are extracted from information systems of agents.
Any leaf agent realizes its approximate speci cation by choosing in the subset Inv\U(ag) of the inventory of primitive constructs a construct satisfying this speci cation.
The bottom-up communication consists of agents sending to their parents the chosen constructs and vectors of their rough mereological distances from the standards. The root agent root(Ag) assembles the nal construct.
Our approach is analytic in the sense that all objects necessary for the synthesis process are extracted from the empirical knowledge of agents represented in their information systems; it is also intensional in the sense that rules for propagating uncertainty are local as they depend on a particular elementary synthesis scheme and on a particular local standard.
Our presentation is divided into ve sections. Preliminary notions of the rough set theory and mereology of Le sniewski are collected in Section 2 and Section 3. In Section 4 rough mereology is introduced in the form of the logic L rm . Properties of models of L rm , including properties of rough inclusions, are studied in Section 5. The nal Section 6 brings a more detailed analysis of approximate reasoning by a system of distributed agents.
Preliminaries: Rough Set Theory
The formalization of vagueness within the framework of rough set theory is based on the assumption that objects are perceived by means of the information about them encompassed in a set of available features or attributes 20]; this informal idea leads to the notion of the information system. An information system is a pair A = (U; A) where U is a nite set called the universe of objects and A is a nite set of attributes; any attribute a 2 A is a mapping on the universe U. We denote by the symbol V a the range of the attribute a; the set V a is called the value set of a. We let V = fV a : a 2 Ag.
In consequence of the above assumption some objects may become indiscernible. For an object x 2 U we de ne for a set B A the information vector Inf B (x) = f(a; a(x)) : a 2 Bg. We say that objects x; y 2 U We denote by the symbol Stand the class of pairs of the form (U; U ) where U is a nite set and U is the standard rough inclusion on the set U. 
Preliminaries: Mereology of Le sniewski
The importance for logic of the fundamental study of relations of being a part was already stressed by Aristotle. The rst modern mathematical system based on the notion of a relation of being a (proper) part was proposed by Stanislaw Le sniewski 16]. We recall here the basic notions of the mereological system of Le sniewski; in the next section the mereological system of Le sniewski will be extended to the system of approximate mereological calculus called rough mereology.
We consider a nite set U; we assume that U is non-empty. A binary relation on the set U will be called the relation of being a (proper) part in the case when the following conditions are ful lled (P1) (irre exivity) for any x 2 U, it is not true that x x; (P2) (transitivity) for any triple x; y; z 2 U, if x y and y z, then x z.
It follows obviously from (P1) and (P2) that the following property holds (P3) for any pair x; y 2 U, if x y then it is not true that y x.
In the case when x y we say that the object x is a (proper) part of the object y: The notion of being (possibly) an improper part is rendered by the notion of an ingredient 16]; for objects x; y 2 U, we say that the object x is aingredient of the object y when either x y or x = y. We denote the relation of being a -ingredient by the symbol ingr( ); hence we can write (I1) for x; y 2 U, x ingr( ) y i x y or x = y:
It follows immediately from the de nition that the relation of being an ingredient has the following properties:
(I2) (re exivity) for any x 2 U, we have x ingr( ) x; (I3) (weak antisymmetry) for any pair x; y 2 U, if x ingr( ) y and y ingr( ) x then x = y; (I4) (transitivity) for any triple x; y; z 2 U, if x ingr( ) y and y ingr( ) z then x ingr( ) z:
We will call any pair (U; ) where U is a nite set and a binary relation on the set U which satis es the conditions (P1) and (P2) a pre-model of mereology.
We now recall the notions of a set of objects and of a class of objects 16]. For a given pre-model (U; ) of mereology and a property m which can be attributed to objects in U, we will say that an object x is an object m (x object m, for short) when the object x has the property m. The property m will be said to be non-void when there exists an object x 2 U such that x object m: Consider a non-void property m of objects in a set U where (U; ) is a pre-model of mereology.
An object x 2 U is said to be a set of objects with the property m when the following condition is ful lled: (SETm) for any y 2 U, if y object m and y ingr( ) x then there exist z; t 2 U with the properties: z ingr( ) y , z ingr( ) t, t ingr( ) x and t object m:
We will use the symbol x set m to denote the fact that an object x is a set of objects with the property m.
Assume that x set m; if, in addition, the object x satis es the condition (CLm) for any y 2 U, if y object m then y ingr( ) x then we say that the object x is a class of objects with the property m and we denote this fact by the symbol x class m. We will say that a pair (U; ) is a model of mereology when the pair (U; ) is a pre-model of mereology and the condition (EUC) for any non-void property m of objects in the set U, there exists a unique object x such that x class m holds.
The following proposition 16] recapitulates the fundamental metamathematical properties of mereology of Le sniewski; observe that in mereology there is no hierarchy of objects contrary to the Cantorian naive set theory. We denote for an object x 2 U by the symbol ingr(x) the property of being an ingredient of x (non-void in virtue of (I2)) and for a property m; we denote by the symbol s(m) the property of being a set of objects with the property m. A more general proposition will be proved in Section 4. We nally recall the notions of an element and of a subset in mereology of Le sniewski. For x; y 2 U, we will say that (SUB) the object x is a subset of the object y when for any z 2 U; if z ingr( ) x then z ingr( ) y and (EL) the object x is an element of the object y when there exists a non-void property m such that x object m and y class m.
The following proposition which is a direct consequence of (I4) and Proposition 1(i) in Section 3 establishes the fact that in any model of mereology the notion of a subset is equivalent to the notion of an element.
Proposition 4 Assume that a pair (U; ) is a model of mereology. Then the following statements are equivalent for any pair x; y 2 U (i) x ingr( ) y;
(ii) the object x is an element of the object y;
(iii) the object x is a subset of the object y. n (x 1 ; x 2 ; ::; x n ; y) : (x 1 ; y; !)^ (x 2 ; y; !)^:::^ (x n ; y; !);
n (x 1 ; x 2 ; ::; x n ; y) :
8z:f n (x 1 ; x 2 ; ::; x n ; z)^ n (x 1 ; x 2 ; ::; x n ; z)] =) (y; z; !)g: It follows that the intended meaning of a formula (x; y; r) is that "the object x is a part of the object y in degree at least r". given an M -valued assignment g = g X 1 =x 1 ; X 2 =x 2 ; ::; X n =x n ] one checks easily that g Y=y] where Y = X 1 X 2 ::: X n witnesses the truth of (A6) n .
5 Rough inclusions
In this section we are concerned with the structure of models of L rm induced by rough inclusions. We show that in any model of L rm we have a canonical model of mereology of Le sniewski introduced by means of the rough inclusion of this model. We apply the Tarski idea of fusion of sets 43] in order to de ne in a model of L rm the structure of a (complete) Boolean algebra which contains isomorphically the quasi-boolean structure (without the least element) corresponding to the model of mereology of Le sniewski. We show that the rough inclusion satis es with respect to boolean operations of join and meet the same formal conditions which the rough membership function satis es with respect to the set-theoretic operations of union and intersection.
We study relations of rough inclusions with many-valued logic and fuzzy logic; in particular, we show that when the rough inclusion is regarded as a fuzzy membership function then any fuzzy containment induced by a residual implication 11] is again a rough inclusion and moreover, the hierarchy of objects set by the induced model of mereology of Le sniewski is invariant under these fuzzy containment operators.
We are concerned also with the problem of consistency of deduction rules of the form In the sequel we will always work with a xed reduced model M . We denote by the symbol n the null object i.e. the object existing in virtue of (A4) and such that M (n ; w ) = M for any w 2 U M : We will write u 6 = n to denote the fact that the object u is not the null object.
Let us recall that the existence of a null object in a model of mereology of Le sniewski reduces the model to a singleton, as observed in Tarski 42] . In the sequel, for simplicity of notation, we will write in place of M , U in place of U M , u in place of u etc. We will call the rough inclusion a strict rough inclusion when it satis es the condition (x; n) = 0 for any non-null object x; we observe that any standard rough inclusion is strict.
We now show how the rough inclusion introduces in U a model of mereology of Le sniewski. To this end, we de ne a binary relation part( ) on the set U by letting u part( ) w i (u; w) = M and it is not true that (w; u) = M :
Then we have the following proposition whose straightforward proof is omitted Proposition 8 (i) the relation part( ) satis es the conditions (P1) and (P2);
(ii) the relation ingr( part( ) ) satis es the following for any pair u; w 2 U: u ingr(part( )) w i (u; w) = M .
2
It follows from the proposition above that (U; part( )) is a pre-model of mereology. We now de ne in the model M for any collection of objects in U, the notions of a set of objects in and of a class of objects in . We will say then that u 2 U is a set of objects in , u set for short, when (S1) for any w 6 = n such that w ingr(part( ) ) u there exist v 6 = n and t 2 such that v ingr(part( ) ) w, v ingr(part( )) t, t ingr(part( ) ) u; if in addition, we have (S2) t ingr(part( ) ) u for any t 2 ; (S3) for any t, if t satis es (S1) and (S2) with then u ingr(part( ) ) t then we say that u is a class of objects in , u class for short. It follows from (A6) that for any collection there exists a unique object u such that u class and there exists objects of the form set : We 
Proof
As proofs of (ii)-(iv) are carried out on similar lines , we observe that (i) follows immediately from the de nition and we prove (ii) . To prove (ii), we assume that u class Set : Let v 6 = n and v ingr(part( ) ) u. Clearly, u set Set and thus in virtue of (S1) there exist w; t 2 U such that w 6 = n, w ingr(part( ) ) v, w ingr(part( ) ) t, t ingr(part( ) ) u and t set : Hence, again by the truth of (S1), there exist p; q 2 U such that p 6 = n; p ingr(part( )) w; p ingr(part( )) q, q ingr(part( )) t and q 2 :
Then we have q ingr(part( ) ) u and thus u set . It follows that u satis es (S1) with . Now, we consider any q 2 ; clearly, q set and by the truth of (S2) we have q ingr(part( ) ) u i.e. u satis es (S2) with . Finally, assume that w 2 U satis es the condition (u; w) < M ; it follows by (S3) that either w does not satisfy (S1) or w does not satisfy (S2) with Set . We consider the two cases.
Case 1. w does not satisfy (S2). There exists z 2 U, such that (z; w) < M and z set .
Subcase 1a. We assume that for any t 2 U if t 6 = n , t ingr(part( )) z and t 2 , then t ingr(part( )) w. We consider t 2 U such that t 6 = n, and t ingr(part( )) z. As we have z set , there exist by (S1) p; q 2 U such that p 6 = n , p ingr(part( )) t, p ingr(part( )) q , q ingr(part( )) z and q 2 .
By our assumption, we have q ingr(part( )) w. Hence p ingr(part( )) w and it follows from (A4) that z ingr(part( )) w, a contradiction.
It follows that we are left with Subcase 1b.
There exists v 2 U such that v 6 = n, v ingr(part( )) z, v 2 and (v; w) < M . But this means that w does not satisfy (S2) with .
Case 2. w does not satisfy (S1). Then clearly, it is not true that w set i.e. w does not satisfy (S1) with :
It follows from Cases 1 and 2 that u class . This concludes the proof of (ii) and the proof of the proposition.
2
We now outline the boolean structure induced in the model M by the rough inclusion . We rst de ne, extending the idea of 16], the relation ext ( ); to this end, we let for u; w 2 U : u ext ( ) w i it is not true that there exists z 2 U such that z 6 = n, z ingr(part( )) u, and z ingr(part( )) w. Following the idea of Tarski 43], we de ne boolean operations _ M ,^M, : M by letting for u; w 2 U: u _ M w is the class of objects in (u; w) where (u; w) is the collection of objects which contains an object t i either t ingr(part( )) u or t ingr(part( )) w; u^M w is the class of objects in (u; w) where (u; w) is the collection of objects which contains an object t i t ingr(part( )) u and t ingr(part( )) w; nally, : M u is the class of objects in (u) where (u) is the collection of objects which contains an object t i t ext ( ) u.
We have the following proposition; the straightforward proof much in the spirit of the proof of Proposition 4 in Section 5 is omitted.
Proposition 11 The operations _ M ,^M; : M introduce into the set U the structure of a Boolean algebra viz. the following properties hold
(vii) (u^Mw) congr( ) (w^Mu);
(viii) (u^M (w^Mz)) congr( ) ((u^Mw)^Mz);
(ix) (u^M u) congr( ) u; (x) (u^M (: M u)) congr( ) n;
(xi) (u^MU) congr( ) u;
We now observe that the rough inclusion behaves with respect to the boolean operations _ M and^M in the same way as the rough membership function behaves to the set-theoretic operations of the union and the intersection; the following proposition is therefore a far-reaching generalization of prop 2 (vi), (vii) in Section 2 and it demonstrates that the operators max and min are the limiting operators in , respectively, the additive and the multiplicative cases, in the widest sense.
Proposition 12 (i) (u; v _ M w) max f (u; w), (v; w)g;
(ii) (u^Mv; t) min f (u; t), (v; t)g.
Proof It su ces to observe that (u^Mw) ingr(part( )) u , (u^Mw) ingr (part( )) w , u ingr(part( )) (u _ M w) and w ingr(part( )) (u _ M w) and to apply (A2). Proof We rst observe that > (u; u) = inff ? ! > ( u (z); u (z)) : z 2 Ug = inff1 : z 2 Ug = 1. Next, we assume that > (u; w) = 1; it follows that ? ! > ( u (z); w (z)) = 1 for any z 2 U hence we have u (z) = >(1; u (z)) w (z) and thus ? ! > ( v (t); w (t)) ? ! > ( v (t); u (t)) for all v; t which by taking the in mum over all t yields > (v; w) > (v; u): We now assume that > (u; w) = 1 = > (w; u). Hence we have ? ! > ( u (t); w (t)) = 1 and ? ! > ( w (t); u (t)) = 1 for any t 2 U. It follows that w (t) >(1; u (t)) = u (t) and, similarly, u (t) w (t) for any t 2 U. We have therefore u (t) = w (t) for any t 2 U. For a given v 2 U, we therefore obtain > (u; v) = inff>( u (t); v (t)); t 2 Ug = inff ? ! > ( w (t); v (t)) : t 2 Ug = > (w; v).
We now consider > (n; u) for u 2 U; we have > (n; u) = inff ? ! > ( n (z); u (z)) : z 2 Ug = 1 (either z is the null-object and then ? ! > ( n (z); u (z)) = ? ! > (1; 1) = 1 or z 6 = n and ? ! > ( n (z); u (z)) = ? ! > (0; u (z)) = 1 ). We have proved that (U; > ) is a model for (A1)-(A4).
We now digress from the proof that > is a rough inclusion and we prove that
(ii) holds. We rst assume that > (u; w) = 1. Then we have ? ! > ( u (z); w (z)) for any z 2 U hence >( u (u); w (u)) = 1 and this implies that 1 w (u)
i.e. (u; w) = 1: We now assume that (u; w) = 1; it follows by (A2) that (v; w) (v; u) for any v 2 U hence ? ! > ( u (v); w (v)) = 1 for any v 2 U and it follows that > (u; w) = 1:
It follows that if we have a condition employing the formula > (u; w) = 1 and we replace in this condition the formula > (u; w) = 1 by the formula (u; w) = 1 then we obtain the equivalent condition. From this remark it infer immediately that > satis es (A5) and (A6). This concludes the proof. Proof We assume that > (u; v) = r; > (v; w) = s: We have r = inff ? ! > ( u (t); v (t)) : t 2 Ug and s = inff ? ! > ( v (t); w (t)) : t 2 Ug. Clearly, when r = 1 = s, the rule (D > ) is the rule (D1). We consider some cases.
1. In the case when r < 1 and s = 1, we have v (t) w (t) for any t 2 U and thus > (u; w) = inff ? ! > ( u (t); w (t)) : t 2 Ug inff ? ! > ( u (t); v (t)) : t 2 Ug = r = >(r; 1):
2. In the case when r = 1 and s < 1 it is enough to consider a xed t 2 U such that r t = ? ! > ( u (t); v (t)) = 1 and s t = ? ! > ( v (t); w (t)) < 1. We have u (t) v (t) and >(s t ; v (t)) = w (t) hence >(s t ; u (t)) w (t) which implies that ? ! > ( u (t); w (t)) s t = >(1; s t ) =>(r t ; s t ); passing to in ma over t on both sides gives > (u; w) inff>(r t ; s t ) : t 2 Ug >(inffr t : t 2 Ug; inffs t : t 2 Ugg = >(r; s):
3. It remains to consider the case when r; s < 1. We proceed as in the case 2 i.e. we take a xed t 2 U and we consider r t and s t de ned above. We show that we always have the inequality ? ! > ( u (t); w (t)) >(r t ; s t ) from which the inequality > (u; w) >(r; s) follows by passing to in ma on both sides. The case r t = 1ands t < 1 has already been considered in case 2 and the case r t = 1 = s t follows obviously. In the case r t < 1; s t = 1 we proceed in the same way as in the case 1. It remains to consider the case r t < 1; s t < 1: We have >(r t ; u (t)) = v (t) and >(s t ; v (t)) = w (t): It follows that >(s t ; >(r t ; u (t))) = w (t) i.e. >(>(r t ; s t ); u (t)) = w (t). It follows that ? ! > ( u (t); w (t)) >(r t ; s t ) and by taking the in mum over all t we obtain the inequality > (u; w) inff>(r t ; s t ) : t 2 Ug >(inffr t : t 2 Ug; inffs t : t 2 Ug) = >(r; s):
This concludes the proof.
6 An Application: A Rough Mereology Based Distributed System For Synthesis of Approximative Solutions
We present a general scheme for synthesis of approximate solutions to a given requirement. We begin with introductory remarks which provide a motivation and explain our methodological assumptions.
Methodology
We begin with an example of a synthesis of a solution in a classical context.
Consider a formula : p ?! p in the propositional calculus 19]. To give a formal proof of requires a derivation of from a system of axioms of the propositional calculus by means of allowed inference rules. An exemplary derivation of is the following one represented in a sequence of steps.
Step 1. Step 3. From the formulas (M) and (I1) the formula (R) is obtained by applying the (MP) inference rule (R) p ?! p.
The formula (R) is and the derivation is concluded. The above derivation of the formula can be regarded as a scheme for synthesis of a solution (a derivation) to the requirement : In this scheme we can distinguish some specialized agents: R, M, I1, I2, I3. The agents perform specialized tasks and are involved in communication and negotiation processes which can be described in a sequence of stages.
Stage 1. The agent R (the root agent of the scheme) receives the formula and decomposes it into some formulas ; (possibly non-uniquely) from which it can produce by means of its operation (MP).
Stage 2. The agent R and agents M, I1 negotiate the particular decomposition of ; in our example, the decomposition is chosen into (M) and (I1).
Stage 3. The agent I1 is an inventory (leaf) agent : it is able to nd a required formula in the inventory of instances of axiom schemata. The agent M can repeat the stage 1 with the formula (M) by negotiating with agents I2 and I3 the decomposition of (M) into formulas , from which M is able to produce (M) by means of its inference rule (MP). In our example, this decomposition is (I2), (I3).
Stage 4. The agents I1, I2, I3 send the required negotiated formulas from the inventory to their parents. The agent M synthesizes the formula (M) and sends it to the parent R. The agent R produces the formula (R) and sends it as the solution satisfying the requirement along with the assertion of its correctness.
We would like to adopt the above scheme as a general scheme for reasoning under uncertainty. In the process of generalizing the above scheme to a scheme for reasoning under uncertainty we have to take into account the following remarks.
Remark 6.1. The knowledge of an agent in a scheme for reasoning under uncertainty is subjective and incomplete. In particular, an agent may not be able to distinguish among certain requirements(speci cations, formulas etc. Remark 6.6. Problem speci cations are issued by the external agent cag (the customer agent) in a language understandable to some agents in the scheme (in particular, to the root agent R). The speci c form of the language depends on the particular synthesis process.
The object x synthesized by the scheme as an approximate solution to a requirement is evaluated by the agent cag with respect to its local knowledge. The process of learning the correct synthesis of solutions to a given speci cation is concluded when the two evaluations are consistent.
We would like to adopt rough mereology as a foundational basis for a general scheme for reasoning under uncertainty. We will therefore accept the following assumptions.
Assumption 1. Universes of objects (universes of discourse) of agents are models of L rm in which certain collections of objects, called standard objects, are distinguished. The rough inclusions of the universes induce rough mereological distance functions in their respective domains by means of which objects are perceived and characterized with respect to the standards in the respective universe.
Assumption 2. The semantics of the approximate logic of formulas of the form ( ; ) of any agent ag is de ned in terms of standards of ag and the rough mereological distance function in the universe of objects of the agent ag.
Assumption 3. Local uncertainty measures (uncertainty coe cients ) are propagated from the children of an agent ag to the agent ag by means of functions extracted from intensional dependencies discovered from the knowledge (information systems) of agents.
Our approach can be precisely described as "an analytical approximate reasoning" in the sense that all necessary ingredients for the reasoning scheme are extracted or inferred from the empirical knowledge represented by the information systems of the agents.
The agent structure
We will discuss here the structure of a single agent ag in a scheme S of agents.
We begin with a theoretical result which will simplify our treatment of the reasoning scheme. Uncertainty relations express the agents knowledge about relationships among uncertainty coe cients of any agent ag and uncertainty coe cients of its children. The relational character of these dependencies expresses their intensionality. Uncertainty rules provide functional operators for propagating unceratinty measure values from the children of an agent to the agent; their application is in negotiation processes where they inform agents about plausible uncertainty bounds.
9. H(ag) is a strategy which produces uncertainty rules from uncertainty relations; to this end, various rigorous formulas as well as various heuristics can be applied. We will comment brie y on the semantics of approximate formulas of the form ( ; "); our discussion is a very concise extract from 15] where the approximate logic L approx of a system of agents is discussed formally. Consider a predicate 2 L(ag) and " 2 0; 1]. The approximate formula ( ; ") has the intended meaning of a formula satis ed in a degree "; formally, we will say that a construct (object) x 2 U(ag) satis es the approximate formula ( ; ") i there exists a standard st(ag) such that st(ag) satis es the formula and o (ag)(x; st(ag)) ". In particular, for a decomposition rule dec rule i as in (10) above x satis es ( (ag); ") whenever o (ag)(x; st(ag)) "; clearly, st(ag) satis es the approximate formula ( (ag); 1).
The approximate reasoning by a system of agents
We now consider a system S of agents over an inventory INV . We assume that the relation , de ned by ag 0 ag i ag 1 ag 2 :::ag k ag 2 Link(ag) and there exists i k such that ag 0 = ag i , orders S into a tree; we assume that any agent ag in S has exactly n standards which satisfy the composition rule in the sense that if ag 1 ag 2 :::ag k ag 2 Link(ag) and ag i produces from standards st(ag 1 1 ) j ,...., st(ag k k k ) j the standard st(ag) j . We denote by the symbol Root(S) the root agent of the scheme S and the symbol Leaf(S) will denote the set of leaf (inventory) agents of S. We now present the the objects chosen in the inventory also with the vector of distances from standards.
Step 8. The agent Root(S) assembles the nal object x , calculates the vector of distances from its standards and checks that the object x satis es the speci cation ( i (Root(S)); (Root(S))). In the positive case the object x is issued to the agentcag.
We also would like to underline the control mechanism incorporated into the above procedure.
Remark 6.7. Let us observe that the condition imposed on the uncertainty function f i does not guarantee that when the children ag 1 ; ag 2 ; :::; ag k of ag select objects x 1 , x 2 ,...,x k such that o (ag j )(x j ; st(ag j ) i ) (ag j ) then we have o (ag)(o i (x 1 ; ::; x k ); st(ag) i ) (ag) ; such demand would be unrealistic. It may happen therefore that the agent ag will nd that it cannot assenmble an object which would satisfy its speci cation. In this case it is able to interrupt the synthesis process and to demand better quality parts (e.g. greater uncertainty coe cients (ag j )) or a renewal of the negotiation process etc. Our scheme acts therefore as a controller.
We will comment brie y on the negotiation tasks in the scheme S.
Remark 6.8. We would like to observe that the agents in S can communicate by means of mereological decomposition schemes indued by their quasi-rough inclusions; the communication process is based on the observation that for any ag 1 ag 2 ::ag k ag 2 Link(ag), the agent ag construct its complex objects as classes in the sense of mereology of Le sniewski of simpler objects and these simpler objects in turn are complex objects (classes in mereological sense) in the universes of children. 
Conclusions
We have presented a conceptual scheme for approximate reasoning about complex systems in the processes of synthesis of complex systems from simpler parts. Our analysis is applicable as well to problems of design, analysis and control in complex systems 31], 40]. Our approach is based on rough mereology and rough inclusions determine local decomposition schemes of agents by means of which agents establish the mereological hierarchies of objects. The relationships among agents resulting from the inferred local decomposition schemes are encoded in strings in Link and they are used in determining a scheme formation for synthesis of an approximate solution to a given requirement. All relations and functions which determine the mechanisms for propagation of uncertainty as well as mechanisms of negotiatons are inferred from knowledge of agents represented in their information systems. The adaptiveness of our scheme is achieved by means of of an adjustment of rough inclusions chosen by agents, modi cations of uncertainty relations and uncertainty functions due to the appearance of new yet unseen objects (constructs), improvements in the performance of agents due to the learning processes, and possibilities for redesigning the scheme due to new mereological hierarchies that result from other changes to the scheme and its environment. The limitations of this scheme are due to the complexity of learning tasks leading to the choice of rough inclusions, uncertainty relations and rules, and to the scheme formation.
